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Abstract
This paper uses panel data from 45 OECD and Latin American countries over
21 years to estimate the effect of different tax structures on GDP growth. A
key aim is to compare the results from using two common measurement tech-
niques, statutory tax rates and tax revenues as share of total tax income. The
results from GMM estimations indicate that the choice of measure not only
affects the statistical results, but is of critical importance regarding economic
interpretations. While the use of tax rates show a small significant negative
connection between corporate income taxes and growth, tax revenues demon-
strate a positive effect. The results call for more caution and better theoretical
understanding regarding the effect of tax structures on growth given the choice
of measure.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
One of the more, if not the most, studied economic concepts is GDP growth.
Because of its close connection to economic prosperity, how to create long run
economic growth has been an essential question for academics and politicians
for long.
For many years growth modeling relied on exogenous models. This im-
plies that the technological progress was given, and output per worker was
constant. Assuming this, the effect of government policy is very limited, if not
non-existent. With the development of endogenous growth models, where tech-
nological progress is an internal feature of the model, the effects of policy became
increasingly relevant. Naturally, this also opens for a possible link between taxes
and growth (Lee and Gordon 2005: 1028).
Looking at growth and taxes in a very simplified fashion, higher taxes imply
behavioral changes. For example, higher personal income taxes imply lower net
wages, which decreases the price of leisure. Assuming this causes less work and
more leisure, higher taxes could affect total economic output in a negative sense.
On the other end, revenues from higher taxes raise the possibility to invest in
human and physical capital (for example schools and roads) thereby possibly
increasing growth.
This very simplified version does, however, not help much to sort out the
differences between tax structures. Today most countries have rather complex
tax systems spanning from simple income taxes on wages to excise taxes on
fuel. It goes without saying that the effects of these taxes differ a great deal. To
contribute to the understanding of the connection between tax-structures and
growth, is the topic of this essay.
Previous research within the field has failed to offer consistent conclusions.
Corporate income taxes has turned out both positive and negative, and results
for consumption taxes and personal income taxes are not consistently significant.
Furthermore, most research focus on OECD-countries.
More importantly, even if research has evolved in dealing with relevant em-
pirical problems such as different covariates, endogeneity and unit roots, there
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is still no consensus on how to measure tax structures. The two most common
approaches are the theoretically appealing statutory tax rates, and the measure
with the highest data availability: tax revenue as share of total tax revenues.
Using the value added tax (vat) as an example, the former uses the standard
rate of, say 20 %, while the latter uses the percentage of tax revenues which
were raised from the chosen tax.
Awareness of the problems of using the measures interchangeably are grow-
ing, and some recent papers have addressed and discussed the specific problem
of using tax revenues as a measure of tax structures (Myles 2007; Gemmel et al
2011). As of today no paper have, however, compared the results of using the
different measures in a similar estimation framework. This paper is aimed at
filling this gap.
1.1 Purpose, method and disposition
Specifically, this paper compares the results of using either tax rates or rev-
enues to estimate the effect of different tax structures on long run growth, using
a panel of 45 Latin American and OECD countries during 1990-2010.
Econometrically this is done by applying different versions of GMM. The
three structures compared are consumption taxes (vat), personal income taxes
(pit) and corporate income taxes (cit).
Besides from using both measures, the paper adds value to current research
by:
• Expanding the number of countries used in tax rates estimations, by in-
cluding more OECD countries and adding developing Latin American
countries
• Using the GMM estimator
• Adding new control variables
The rest of the essay is divided into five parts. The next section gives a
broad theoretical background, including growth theory, description of taxes and
the expected relation between the two concepts. Part three discusses empirical
strategies and part four gives an explanation of the measure of different vari-
ables, as well as descriptive statistics and trends in the data. Results are found
in the fifth part, and finally the last chapter concludes.
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Chapter 2
Theoretical background -
Growth and taxes
The interest of this essay lies in understanding the relation between tax
structures and growth. To be able to make such a connection, it is essential
to conceptualize taxes into different subcategories. To evaluate each and every
one of the taxes within a country is neither possible nor interesting. Hence, this
section starts with an introduction to the most common and most important
tax structures. Second, the essential features of growth models are discussed,
creating an analytical platform for how taxes might affect growth. Third and
final, I discuss the plausible effects of different tax structures on growth.
2.1 Taxes
2.1.1 Income taxes
Income taxes are generally parted in two different forms of taxes: personal
income taxes (pit) and corporate income taxes (cit). The former refer to taxes
on wage earnings, while the latter are taxes on earnings made from corporate
assets. Pit and cit affect behavior in different ways. Since pit is levied on
wages it affects labor supply, both negatively and positively.1 Cit on the other
hand affects investments. The two are also interconnected. Assuming the cit
rate keeps decreasing while pit stays steady, wage paying citizens would have
incentives to register as a corporation, thereby causing unproductive rent seek-
ing. Furthermore, since many countries have different tax rates depending on
income (often progressive), it matters whether or not the average or marginal
taxes are analyzed.
1See Hindriks and Myles (2006: 479-486) for a theoretical and empirical introduction. It
is also important to note that some countries include not only wage income but also other
forms of unearned income within the concept pit.
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Pit and cit have for long been two of the most important tax sources for a
large set of countries. In figure 2.1 the structure of the tax system in OECD
and Latin America (measured as revenue share of total tax income) is shown.
As can be seen, especially pit has long been an important source of revenues.
Together with the general consumption tax (retail sales tax or value added tax),
they represent somewhat half of all the tax revenues.
Figure 2.1: Percentage of total tax revenues from different tax
structures. OECD and Latin America 1990-2010
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2.1.2 Consumption taxes
The consumption tax is an increasingly important group of taxes. It inherits
any tax on the sales or purchase of goods. Effects are, at least theoretically,
easily analyzed. A higher tax raises the price of the good, causing less consump-
tion.2 How much consumption goes down depends on the demand elasticity of
the good.
Consumption taxes include many different kinds of taxes. For example,
excise taxes aim directly at decreasing or increasing consumption because of
market failures. This includes for example taxation on alcohol, tobacco or fuel.
Almost all countries also have some form of general consumption tax levied
on any purchase of goods. This kind of tax can be constructed in different ways.
Today the most common is the value added tax (vat), which has replaced the
2Theoretically it is possible for consumption to go up with higher prices. These kinds
of goods are, however, very rare and the standard assumption for almost all goods is that
demand decreases with higher prices (normal good).
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standard retail sales tax (rst) in many parts of the world (Fjeldstat 1995: 2;
Bird and Gendron 2007: 16). While the latter taxes only the last chain of the
production (e.g. the consumption of the good), the former taxes the value added
to the product after each chain of production. Important when analyzing the
effect of either vat or rst is the complexity of the tax. This includes different
rates for different goods, and whether corporations of all sizes are tax liable or
not.3
2.2 Growth Theory
The importance of tax policy became an important part of growth model-
ing with the development of endogenous models. However, since more or less
all endogenous growth models originates from the exogenous Solow model, it
might be good to provide the basic outline of the model, and understand the
implications for tax policy. Only a couple of brief statements are made here, a
full derivation of the Solow model is available in Appendix A.
2.2.1 Baseline model - Exogenous growth4
The model assumes a single good economy, were output is either consumed or
saved. All savings are invested in capital goods (K). Besides capital, labor (L) is
also part of the output function. Solow further assumed a constant depreciation
rate of capital (δ), a fixed savings rate (s) and that output per worker is fixed.
Population grows at rate n and production inherits constant returns to scale.
Based in the above assumptions, Solow could derive the basic capital accu-
mulation relationship.
Kt+1 = sF (Kt, Lt) + (1− δ)Kt (2.1)
What 2.1 says is simply that capital in period t + 1 equals investments (or
savings) plus depreciated capital from period t. Using per capita expressions, it
is possible to rewrite the model, and provide steady state expressions as in 2.2
and 2.3:
(1 + n)k = sf(k) + (1− δ)k (2.2)
sf(k)− (n+ δ)k = 0 (2.3)
Where kt =
Kt
Lt
. It should be clear from 2.3 that the equilibrium level
can be lifted with increased savings, and dampened with population growth.
Here, there might be a case for policy in general and tax policy in particular.
However, since s is limited (0 < s < 1), there is no possibility of sustained
growth. Furthermore, a change in the savings rate will not imply a continuous
3As a simple example: Sweden has two reduced rates besides the standard rate of 25 %.
These are 12 % (hotels, restaurants and food) and 6% (books and public transportation).
4This section is based mainly on Myles (2007) and Sørensen and Whitta-Jacobsen (2010).
7
change in growth, only a one-time shift. Solow therefore leaves very little room
for tax policy.
One way to create continuous growth is to include another variable in the pro-
duction function (A.1), which is often called technological progress (T ): f(k, T ).
In practice, this implies that labor and capital are becoming more productive.
The problem with this kind of model is of course that the explanation for growth
remains unexplained. All that has been done so far is to assume an exogenous
cause of growth. This mechanism is explained in endogenous models.
2.2.2 Endogenous growth
Human Capital
One way to explain and model continuous growth is to add a human capital
(H) variable in the production function. This can either be done by adding H
as a separate input to K and L, or by writing H as a function of labor time
and quality. Using the latter, and assuming a joint constant returns to scale in
H and K, one can write:
Yt = F (Kt, Ht) (2.4)
2.4 provides a simple case for sustained increased output, which grows with
investment, even with fixed labor supply. Now there is a stronger case for
economic policy. Regarding taxes, the interesting theoretical case lies in the
effect on the decision to invest in human and physical capital. Regarding the
former, this practically implies investment in education.
Innovation
The theoretical groundwork on the connection between innovation and growth
was delivered by Schumpeter (1934). His idea of creative destruction, which im-
plies the process where older products are replaced by newer superior ones,
became the theoretical basics for technological progress. This can either be
modelled by using intermediary products, or completely new which replaces the
existing ones.
Formal modeling of this process, however, appeared much later. It is possible
to think of this as modeling technology T . The output of a company (Y ), is
made in a technological process according to 2.5:
Yit = Aitx
α
it (2.5)
where i is a final good, x is the intermediate good, A is the level of technology
and t is a time index. An intermediate good x is given by the innovative firm
creating it, causing the technology A of the final good to increase to the highest
possible on the market. Since no other company has a comparable technology,
the innovative firm now has a monopoly position until another technology comes
along. The technology hence increases over time, proportional to the number
of innovations in intermediate goods, which in turn depends on the amount of
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resources deployed in research. The decision for a company is between the costs
of research and the profits made from innovations. The role of tax policy is
hence to increase the net returns of innovation.
Institutions
A last important factor that stands out from the classical growth models, is
that of economic, legal and political institutions. North (1991: 97) defines in-
stitutions as ”the humanly devised constraints that structure political economic
and social interaction”. Based in this line of reasoning, institutions matter
for growth since it affects transaction costs. The importance of institutions
therefore differs somewhat from the theoretical notions discussed above, since
transaction costs are disregarded in neoclassical models.
With the definition given by North, institutions capture a great deal of
concepts. Since this essay does not concern the link between institutions and
growth per se, no in-depth theoretical review will be made. One stratification
however deserves mentioning, which is the difference between informal and for-
mal institutions. While formal institutions inherit written legal rules concerning
property rights, judiciary and bureaucracy, informal rules is best described by
the national, regional or local culture of a country. Williamsson (2000: 597)
models this in an appealing matter. While formal rules have great importance
as the rule of the game, these rules have to be embedded in an already existing
culture. Forcing formal rules into a culture might be dampening for develop-
ment. In the context of growth regressions over twenty years, informal rules are
difficult to test since these do, according to Williamsson, change with a pace of
up to several hundred years. Still, it is important to be aware of the complexity
of institutional effects.
2.3 The effect of tax structures on growth
Tax policy should foremost effect growth via economic variables discussed in
the section above. Starting with personal income taxes, Heckman et al (1998)
discusses the effect of progressivity on investment in human capital. Higher
marginal taxes might induce lower education. The reason is that, if treated
as an investment, the return of human capital decreases with higher marginal
income taxes.
Another effect of pit concerns the supply of labor. Higher marginal taxes on
wages have theoretically two possible effects, most often labeled as income and
substitution effects. The former is the effect on your income, which in the case
of a tax raise, means lower income. Hypothetically a person would hence have to
work more to earn the same amount of money, causing more hours worked. On
the other hand, the substitution effect implies that the relative price of leisure
goes down, causing less hours worked. The question of the effect of pit on work
supply hence becomes an empirical question. As noted by Kimball and Shapiro
(2008: 1), many economists believe that substitution and income effects are very
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similar in magnitude, giving a total net effect of close to zero. However, the long
run economic implications might differ depending on whether both effects are
small or large. Kimball and Shapiro do in fact find the latter to be true:
High estimates of labor supply elasticities also have implications for
public finance. With parameters as large as we find, the long-run
effects of taxation on labor supply are likely to yield very substantial
distortions and dead-weight burdens (Kimball and Shapiro 2008:
42).
Regarding the rate of innovation, both pit and cit might be important. As-
suming that it is possible for a corporation to register both as corporate and
non-corporate, and further assuming higher pit than cit, it would be possible
and beneficial to register profits as corporate and losses as non-corporate. Big
differences between the two taxes can therefore induce risk-taking, which pos-
sibly is beneficial for innovation (Lee and Gordon 2005). Assuming that all
corporate activity is registered as corporate, higher cit are, ceteris paribus, bad
for the evolution of new technology.
However, higher marginal income taxes or corporate income taxes also bring
larger public spending possibilities. Any empirical investigation of the relation
should hence control for the possibility of higher investments as well as the
discouraging incentive effects.
Regarding consumption taxes, which has not been mentioned so far, the
case is less clear, and the theoretical literature is less well developed. It is
for example striking that one of the latest examples within previous research,
Acosta-Ormaechea and Yoo (2012), find a positive effect on growth from con-
sumption taxes, but fail to give a theoretical explanation to why this relationship
might exist. One possibility, described by Gordon and Lee (2005: 1031), is that
a higher vat might cause lower risk taking, assuming there is no loss-offset for
companies within the vat-system. This is because a company with a negative
value added will not receive any tax rebate. However, if companies with losses
are offset by the authorities, a vat system should be better from an innovation
perspective since the taxes are proportional to the net return.
Arnold et al (2011: 71) concludes that the harmful effects on investments
and savings should be small. This however only applies if the structure can be
expected to be stable over time, and more importantly if the system is based in
a uniform rate. Too many exceptions might be harmful.
All in all, the expected effect and hypothesis of the paper is that, ceteris
paribus, moving from income taxes to consumption taxes should have a positive
effect on growth. The effect of moving from corporate income taxes to personal
income taxes is theoretically largely unclear, and any effect is plausible.
2.4 Previous research
As indicated above, previous research on the relation between tax structures
and growth has evolved largely due to the development of endogenous growth
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models. Hence, the empirical field has grown greatly over the last twenty years,
both in matters of measurement and empirical strategies. It should be noted
that all of the papers referred to onwards utilize panel data.
One of the earlier examples are Easterly and Rebelo (1993). The authors
calculate an average marginal income tax, using both tax revenues and statutory
rates, and regress GDP on the calculated measure. The results are significant
with a negative trend in a bivariate analysis, but fail to produce significant
results in a multivariate framework. Further focusing specifically on a measure
of income taxes, are Padovano and Galli (2001). The authors regress total
tax revenues on a measure of tax reforms, GDP and the interaction in-between
these two variables. The coefficient of tax reform is then treated as the estimated
marginal taxes. Using a random effects estimation of OECD countries between
1950 and 1990, the authors conclude that there is a statistically significant
negative effect from higher marginal taxes.
More interesting are the papers including several structures. Mendoza et
al (1997) are among the early examples. Calculating five-year average effective
tax rates for consumption and income taxes in 18 OECD countries, the authors
find no significant effect upon growth. While the effect upon investment is
significant, it is not large enough to affect growth as well. Kneller et al (1999)
use a similar data set (22 OECD countries) but instead compare the effect of
five-year averages of distortionary and non-distortionary taxes. Distortionary in
this context means all taxes that potentially affects investment, which according
to the authors include all taxes except taxes on goods and sales. Hence, non-
distortionary taxes are a mixture between everything from property taxes to
corporate income taxes. The foremost added value of the paper is, however,
the use of a budget constraint. As noted by the authors, only including taxes
and not expenditures (such as in Mendoza et al (1997)) will produce a bias
towards a zero coefficient. This is because a potentially negative effect from for
example high direct taxes will be offset by productive government expenditures.
When controlling for this, the authors find a significant negative effect from
distortionary taxes over non-distortionary taxes.
Widmalm (2001) measures taxes as revenue-share of total tax revenue, and
uses several different structures, such as property taxes, personal income taxes
and corporate income taxes. Just as previously mentioned papers, Widmalm
uses OECD countries. Applying an extreme bound estimation strategy, she finds
some support that consumption taxes are better from a growth perspective.
Interestingly, corporate income taxes are found to have a positive ”significant
but fragile” effect on growth.
The strategy to measure taxes as revenue share of total taxes is further used
in two of the most recent papers: Arnold et al (2011) and Acosta-Ormaechea
and Yoo (2012). The former again uses OECD countries, but adds the use of
pooled mean group (PMG) estimations. This basically implies that coefficients
are assumed to be homogenous over countries in the long run but not in the
short run. Acosta-Ormaechea and Yoo uses a similar methodology but includes
80 countries, expanding the results to developing countries. Both papers reach
similar results, namely that property taxes and consumption taxes seem to be
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better from a growth perspective as opposed to other taxes.
Using revenue-share of total revenues or different forms of aggregate average
or calculated marginal rates, involves several problems. As noted by Myles
(2007: 89), these ”probably does not affect the rate that any particular economic
decision maker is facing.” In addition, the effect of revenues is dependent on
the degree of tax evasion, which is difficult to account for in panel regression
models.
In the tradition of using statutory marginal and average tax rates, very
few papers have been written. Two papers that deserve mentioning are Lee
and Gordon (2005) and Gemmel et al (2011). The former use a large set of
different sources to estimate the effect of statutory tax rates on growth, applied
to 70 countries. Results are non-significant for consumption taxes and personal
income taxes, while some evidence is put forward that corporate taxes have a
negative effect on growth. Following up on the critique from Myles, Gemmel et
al (2011) expand the use of statutory rates for income taxes to include it in a
PMG-estimation, allowing for short run heterogeneous effects between countries.
The results are mostly as expected, meaning significant negative effects from
higher marginal income taxes and average corporate income taxes. Important
to note, however, is that the authors use a small set of 15 OECD countries, and
the estimated coefficients are very small.
Clearly, previous research is not consistent, and the effect of different struc-
tures have proven both positive and negative. Also, most research focus on
OECD-countries. Results might be very different for developing countries, es-
pecially when using tax revenues as share of total taxes. As noted in the in-
troductory section, while many estimation techniques have been used, previous
research has failed to compare the two most common measures: tax rates and
tax revenues. In the spirit of Myles (2007), the results from using statutory tax
rates are believed to better reflect theoretical expectations.
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Chapter 3
Empirical model
This section discusses the empirical strategy. The discussion addresses the
issue on how to provide consistent panel estimations. The basic setup is accord-
ing to 3.1:
∆yi,t = Xi,tβi + Zitγi + ai + i,t (3.1)
Where yi,t represents the log of GDP PPP per capita (log gdpp) and βi are
the coefficients measuring the effect of different tax variables (Xi,t) (consump-
tion taxes, personal income taxes and corporate income taxes). These will be
measured as either statutory tax rates (cit rate, pit rate and vatgst) or tax rev-
enues as share of total tax income (pit rev, cit rev and vat rev). Furthermore,
γi measures a set of covariates, represented by the vector Zit, which includes
investment in physical and human capital (phy cap and hum cap), population
growth (pop), innovation (high tech), quality of legal institutions (legal) and
the log of total government expenditure (log exp). i and t are indexes of panels
and time and ai is a fixed intercept for each country. i,t is as always the error
term.
The most common method used to model panel data is probably the pooled
fixed or random effects model. ”Pooled” does in this context infer that coeffi-
cients of the different explanatory variables are similar across panels. While this
is a problematic assumption, estimation of models allowing for heterogeneous
panels require a lot of data. The assumption of homogeneous panels is further
mostly considered a problem in longer time series (Blackburn III and Frank
2007). Since a lot of the tax rate data for the Latin American countries exist
only for the latest ten years, pooled regressions will be estimated.
The choice between using fixed and random effects depends on the assump-
tion made regarding the term ai. Statistical tests (i.e. Hausman tests) often
point towards using fixed effects, since the method solves a common problem
within panel data, which is that unobserved country effects are correlated with
the explanatory variables. Formally this implies that E(Ziit) 6= 0 (Angrist and
Pischke 2009: 244).
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Neither random nor fixed effects are, however, consistent in a dynamic con-
text. Assuming a lagged dependent variable, such as in 3.1, yi,t−1 is by construc-
tion correlated with ai, ruling out random effects. And even if individual effects
are left out, the estimator is inconsistent, since a transformed dependent vari-
able will be corrlated with the transformed error term, creating biased estimates
(Angrist and Pischke 2009: 245). Intuitively it is reasonable to assume dynam-
ics in a model with GDP growth. This year’s economic performance should be
dependent on last year’s performance. A different estimation strategy is hence
necessary.
3.1 GMM estimator
The most commonly used GMM approach, the Arellano and Bond estimator
(ABGMM), uses first difference of all the variables in the regression. In this
manner the model accounts for possible unobserved heterogeneity. It further
instruments the first difference of the lagged dependent variable with past levels,
causing less correlation with the error term. In this manner the model reduces
the problem above. Since the number of instruments are many, coefficients are
found via the method of moments, rather than OLS.
Using a simple dynamic model without exogenous covariates, the starting
point is 3.2, which is transformed using first differencing, leaving 3.3.
∆yi,t = ai + it (3.2)
∆yi,t = γ∆yi,t−1 + ∆it (3.3)
Taking for example t = 3, yi,2 − yi,1 can be instrumented with yi,1, since it
is correlated with yi,2− yi,1, but not with the error term vi3− vi,2 (assuming no
lasting serial correlation). The method continues to add an extra instrument
for each period. This leaves 3.4,
E[Zi∆i] = 0 (3.4)
where Zi is a matrix of instruments. 3.4 is now the general moment condi-
tion.
Besides from this version of GMM there is another more efficient way (Blun-
dell and Bond) to treat the instrumentation process. (From now on referred to
as ”System GMM”). Instead of taking the first difference of the baseline model
and using levels of the endogenous variable, it is possible to use the levels of the
baseline variable and first difference the instruments. In other words one flips
the order of the first differencing. Roodman (2006: 29) describes this accord-
ingly: ”In a nutshell, where Arellano-Bond instruments differences with levels,
Blundell-Bond instruments levels with differences.”. The method therefore re-
sembles the first difference GMM in most ways. Only now we must use another
moment condition: E[∆Zi,t−1it] = 0. Note the difference from 3.4.
In the case of growth regressions this is a restrictive statement, since the
implication in practice is that lagged growth levels can not be correlated with
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fixed country effects. If convergence is influential, this assumption will not hold
for different initital GDP levels. For OECD countries, this could be considered
of less importance, since the current growth levels can be expected to be closer
to the long term convergence values. Further, since most of the countries in
this data set are OECD countries, the assumption could hold. It does, however,
rest on very fragile grounds. Therefore both System GMM and ABGMM are
included.
A couple of specific issues regarding GMM are worth noting. First, the
estimator is found using a positive weighting matrix. This matrix can either
be specified in a one-step procedure were homoskedasticity is assumed, or in a
more general procedure were this is not assumed. Based on recommendation in
previous research, this paper uses the one-step procedure (Verbeek 2008: 387).
Second, the number of instruments easily becomes too many. Since the
number of lags increases with a larger sample, GMM estimations can cause
overidentification. To solve this problem, I follow the recommendation from
Mehrhoff (2009: 8,9), who uses principal components analysis (pca) and col-
lapsed instruments to limit the number of instruments used.5
Third, unit roots can imply problems with weak instruments. Based in the
moment condition in 3.4, an AR(1) process with close to a unit root implies a
very weak instrument (Madsen 2003: 6,7). It is therefore relevant to be aware
of unit roots.
It should be noticed that this method is especially relevant with small T and
large N . This is because in cases of longer time periods, fixed effects shocks can
be expected to die out. Consequently, correlation between the error term and
the explanatory variables should be less significant. In this case, the available
time periods are not too many (T = 21), which strengthens the case for the use
of GMM.
5A complete explanation of GMM and the methods used for limiting the number of in-
struments is found in Appendix C.
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Chapter 4
Data
The total data-set includes 45 countries and 21 years (1990-2010). Out of the
45 countries only 10 are non-OECD countries, all of them Latin American.6 The
fact that only 10 countries are non-OECD is important to keep in mind when
analyzing the data, since the conclusions might be more relevant for OECD
countries. A further way to show this is by looking at means for GDP levels.
In table 4.1 these are visible for the full sample, OECD countries and Latin
American countries. Clearly the mean is skewed towards the mean of the richer
countries.
Table 4.1: GDP PPP per capita level in OECD and Latin America
Variable Full sample OECD. Latin America
gdp ppp mean 20833 25122 10276
observations 945 672 273
Numbers are in 2005 international USD
A couple of things are noticeable regarding the tax variables. First, the tax
variables using tax revenue as share of total tax income are all available for
the full sample (945 observations). The tax variables representing stationary
tax rates include a smaller sample, for some countries available only for ten
years. Second, the variance is smaller within the tax rate variables, as is to be
expected. Basic descriptive statistics including mean, standard deviations and
the number of observations are available for all the variables in Appendix B.
4.1 Trends
As was visible in figure 2.1, the revenues drawn from consumption taxes have
steadily been increasing over the past twenty years, while revenues from pit and
6Important to note is that one country, Chile, is both a Latin American and OECD
country. In this context the country will be analyzed as an OECD country.
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cit has remained somewhat similar on average. Regarding rates, what is seen
in figure 4.1, is a similar picture, only less pronounced. Out of the three tax
rates, only consumption taxes show a non-diminishing development. A striking
feature is the large dip in cit, which has dropped steadily from around 38 % on
average to under 30 %. This drop is driven mostly by the OECD countries.
Figure 4.1: Mean of statutory tax rates, full sample 1990-2010
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Figure 4.2: Trend of gdp growth in Latin America and OECD 1990-2010
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A last interesting look is at the trend of GDP. A development we might
expect according to the theoretical works of Solow, is a convergence effect where
poorer countries (ceteris paribus) on average experience higher growth rates.
To see this, I added a final figure with the evolution of growth in the Latin
American and OECD countries over the past twenty years. While the Latin
American countries do not consistently experience higher growth than OECD
countries, there is some tendency for higher average growth in Latin America.
This difference, while not very large, further motivates the use of both system
GMM and ABGMM for the sake of robustness.
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4.2 Variables
4.2.1 Dependent variable - GDP PPP per capita
The variable GDP purchasing power parity (PPP) per capita (gdp ppp)
is collected from World Development Indicators (WDI 2013) and represents
the gross domestic product converted to international dollars using purchasing
power parity rates. Data are in 2005 international dollars. Important to note
is that different authors have used different measures. Arnold et al (2011) uses
GDP per capita, while Gemmel et al (2011) use growth levels. When using
GMM, such as in this paper, GDP per capita should be a better choice due to
first differencing of the variables.
4.2.2 Independent variables - Tax structure
To measure tax structures, both actual statutory rates and revenue shares
will be used. Regarding the former, OECD country-data is collected from
the OECD tax database (OECDa 2013). Rates are available for top marginal
personal income tax (pit rate) between 2000-2011, average corporate tax rate
(cit rate) from 1990 and consumption taxes (vatgst) every second year from
1990 and yearly from 2000. For Latin American countries, all rates are avail-
able from 2000 to 2011, and are taken from the Inter-American Centre for Tax
Administration (CIAT 2013).
It is important to note that the rates on consumption taxes do not separate
between VAT and other sales taxes. One should hence be careful when modeling
this. Since sales tax rates are generally lower, any differences between results
from tax rates instead of revenues could be due to the failure to separate between
the two structures. In the current data set this should be of less significance.
Consumption taxes in almost all countries in the data set are constructed as
value added tax systems. An important exception is United States, a country
that still has no consumption tax on federal level. The US is hence excluded
when estimating vat.
The data on revenues are all collected for personal income taxes (pit rev),
corporate income taxes (cit rev) and consumption taxes (vat rev) from the
OECD revenue share database (OECDb 2013). This database has available
data both regarding OECD countries and Latin American countries for the en-
tire period 1990-2011.
4.2.3 Covariates - Baseline model
From standard growth theory it is possible to infer three variables as essen-
tial. These are more or less always present in empirical estimations. These are
population growth and investment in physical- and human capital.
Starting with the former and least complex, population growth (pop) is
collected from WDI, and is simply measured as the yearly percentage growth in
population over time.
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Physical capital (phy cap) is also collected from WDI, and is, according to
the World Bank: ”outlays on additions to the fixed assets of the economy plus
net changes in the level of inventories”. Practically, additions to assets implies
for example construction of roads, schools or railways and land improvements,
while inventories are firm stocks to meet unexpected fluctuations (WDI 2013).
What should be included in the concept of human capital (hum cap) is up
for debate, and even if one decides on the simplest interpretation - the average
number of schooling years - one faces a lot of missing data over time. Barro and
Lee (2010) solve this by using extrapolation forward as well as backward over
time, which works according to the following:
The authors draw numbers from Eurostat, UNESCO and national statistic
agencies on educational levels for citizens older than 15. This data is segmented
in age groups with five year intervals. For ages higher than 25, it is assumed
that most education is finished. Hence, missing data is filled in using forward
extrapolation, meaning that years of schooling for those aged 30-34 in period t,
is the same as that of those aged 25-29 in period t− 5. The formula is adjusted
for those older than 65, accounting for heterogeneity in mortality rates over
countries.
For those aged younger than 25, school is assumed still in progress. Barro
and Lee instead use backwards extrapolation where a person aged 20-24 at t is
assumed to have the same education as 25-29 in t+ 5.
Since the data set only includes numbers for every fifth year, I use linear
interpolation to create yearly numbers. This method has earlier been used by
for example Acosta-Ormaechea et al (2012). It is, however, important to note
the possibilities of measurement errors.
4.2.4 Other control variables
Some additional control variables are included to account for any other causal
mechanisms outside that of taxes and the basic model described above.
Research and development is important from the point of view of innova-
tion. The most intuitive measure is collected from WDI, and inherits spending
on research and development as a percentage of GDP (WDI 2013). The biggest
problem with the variable is the large amount of missing data. Large gaps
in both specific panels and time series will unfortunately cause serious esti-
mation problems. A second variable (high tech) is therefore included, which
measures the percentage of all manufactured exports which can be classified
as high-technology manufacture. This include, according to WDI, ”aerospace,
computers, pharmaceuticals, scientific instruments, and electrical machinery”
(WDI 2013). The latter variable has a better data coverage, and could function
as a reasonable approximation of the level of innovation in a panel.
Also important are institutions. A recent attempt to create a generic mea-
sure is made by Kuncic (2012). Kuncic separates three different forms of insti-
tutions. These are legal institutions, representing quality of the judiciary and
security of property rights, political institutions, which means for example lim-
its to government power and electoral rules, and finally economic institutions,
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implying ease of doing business and paying taxes.
Kuncic collects already existing empirical indexes, based in the best coverage
and whether or not the index has a proven track-record in academic literature.
He then separates these into the three categories described above. Averages
of all indexes are calculated to create a new index, spanning from 1990-2010.
Measures are indexed on an interval from 0 to 1, where 1 is the highest possible
score. Because of the broad coverage both time and panel wise, the variables
are suitable for this study.
Most important is perhaps government expenditure (exp), which is to rep-
resent the expenditure as percentage of GDP. As noted earlier, this is to control
for any positive expenditure effect from raising higher taxes. The variable is
collected from WDI (2013).
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Chapter 5
Results
In this section the main regression results are presented. The main section
includes results using system GMM. Firstly, results using tax rates as explana-
tory variable are presented. Secondly, results when using tax revenues as share
of total tax revenue are estimated. Thirdly, ABGMM estimations are included
as a robustness check. All estimations are executed using Stata 12.
5.1 Regressions using statutory tax rates
The initial results are presented in five columns in Table 5.1, were the first
column represents the baseline model and the second includes legal institutions
(legal) and innovation (high tech). I choose to include legal institutions rather
than economic since the latter variable measures tax-levels, and might therefore
override the effect of tax structures. Column 3-5 add tax variables and the log of
expenditure (log exp). In each column one of the three tax structures is left out.
This is done to be able to interpret the coefficients as changes in the structure.
If we see a positive coefficient of vatgst when cit rate is left out, one can hence
conclude that relying more on consumption taxes than corporate income taxes
is positively correlated with growth. In the bottom of each column one can note
the number of instruments and a Hansen-test for overidentification.
As discussed in the empirical strategy, to avoid overidentification, the num-
ber of instruments are limited using collapsed instruments and pca-techniques.
All regressions are estimated using robust standard errors. Further diagnostic
checks include tests for unit roots and collinearity. Normality is assumed on the
account of the large amount of observations. Some variables indicate a unit root,
which potentially could be a problem. The problem diminishes when using logs,
however, it should be remembered that the regression could suffer from weak
instruments. A cross correlation table for the baseline variables in the model
indicate no problems with collinearity in the explanatory variables. Unit root
tests and a collinearity table are found in Appendix B.
Looking at the baseline model in table 5.1, the investment variables are
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Table 5.1: System GMM estimations of growth using statutory tax rates: 1990-2010.
Level equation instrumented with first difference lags of log gdpp and explanatory
variables.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES log gdpp log gdpp log gdpp log gdpp log gdpp
L.log gdpp 0.742*** 0.774*** 0.715*** 0.667*** 0.771***
(0.064) (0.063) (0.099) (0.095) (0.076)
hum cap 0.066*** 0.056*** 0.005 0.069*** -0.016
(0.020) (0.019) (0.049) (0.022) (0.034)
phy cap 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.009***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
pop -0.019 -0.009 -0.005 -0.071** -0.078***
(0.019) (0.019) (0.028) (0.033) (0.022)
legal -0.194** 0.611*** 0.566** 0.389
(0.093) (0.172) (0.253) (0.372)
high tech 0.000 -0.001 0.003 0.003*
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
log exp 0.107 0.101 0.142**
(0.124) (0.091) (0.066)
pit rate 0.005* 0.002
(0.003) (0.003)
cit rate -0.001 0.005
(0.004) (0.006)
vatgst 0.001 0.024**
(0.006) (0.011)
Observations 899 899 462 570 445
Number of instruments 21 40 55 55 52
Hansen test 40.11 41.91 38.03 36.60 38.13
(0.011) (0.137) (0.760) (0.810) (0.642)
Robust standard errors in parentheses (Hansen test shows p-values)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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significant and the coefficients are as expected. Human capital has a large posi-
tive effect, while the effect of physical capital is smaller yet still significant. The
lagged level of GDP is significant and has the expected positive sign. Population
growth is not consistently negative, but is negative as expected.
Striking is the non-significance and somewhat irregular sign of high tech and
legal. This might be due to many things. It cannot be ruled out that inno-
vation and institutions, as measured in this context, simply have no effect on
the development of growth. To capture the full effect of institutions is difficult
due to the relation between informal and formal institutions, and the measure
of innovation used here (the share of total export defined as high technology
exports) simply does not capture the full range of the concept. Another possi-
bility is that some of the effect is diminished by the estimation technique, which
uses first differences. I will come back to this theory later in the section.
Regarding the tax variables in column 3-5, vatgst is significant when cit rate
is left out. The variable is as expected positive, which in this scenario would
imply that strengthening consumption taxes over corporate income taxes causes
lower gdp. This is in line with previous work, both theoretical and empirical.
The fact that cit rate and pit rate are non-significant when one or the other
is removed from the equation, is not surprising. As discussed in section three,
while there is a theoretical case for choosing consumption taxes over income
taxes, the case is not as strong when it comes to choosing in-between the two
income tax structures.
More surprising is that pit rate turns positive when vatgst is left out. This
would imply that a shift from consumption taxes to personal income taxes gives
a positive change in GDP. Noticeable in table 5.1 is also that human capital
turns non-significant with the addition of pit rate. Several explanations are
possible. One plausible is that some of the effect of the personal income tax is
picked up by the human capital variable. In line with some previous research,
it is hence interesting to look at a model excluding the baseline model and
covariates. log exp, L.log gdpp and legal are left in the model. The reasons
are in turn that it is still necessary to control for potential expenditures and
the dynamics in the model, while legal is kept since the effect of taxes is not
expected to work through institutions. This is seen in Table 5.2.
As can be seen in the table, vatgst is still positive and significant. While the
variable is now only significant on a ten percent level, it is noticeable that the p-
value is only slightly larger than 0.5. This holds both for a move to consumption
taxes from corporate taxes as well as from personal income taxes. The biggest
effect is given with a move from corporate income taxes to consumption taxes.
The results hence resemble the ones in Table 1, meaning that vatgst should be
preferred over cit rate. Also, as expected, the effect of pit rate in column (1) is
no longer significant nor positive. In fact, it is sufficient to lift the human capital
variable from the regression to make sure that pit rate is no longer significant.
Using tax rates does hence support some of the theoretical predictions.
While none of the tax structures proved consistently highly significant in a
neither positive nor negative direction, numbers indicate a positive effect on
GDP growth from moving from a cit or pit to vat. While the short time span
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Table 5.2: System GMM estimations of growth using statutory tax rates.
No baseline model: 1990-2010. Level equation instrumented with first
difference lags of log gdpp and explanatory variables.
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES log gdpp log gdpp log gdpp
L.log gdpp 0.611*** 0.745*** 0.559***
(0.143) (0.198) (0.176)
log exp 0.076 0.151 0.115
(0.061) (0.156) (0.087)
legal 1.289*** 1.227*** 1.168**
(0.201) (0.283) (0.546)
pit rate -0.000 -0.003
(0.003) (0.007)
cit rate -0.003 0.006
(0.004) (0.012)
vatgst 0.020* 0.037*
(0.010) (0.019)
Observations 462 570 445
Number of instruments 31 29 26
Hansen test 36.39 37.01 35.30
(0.066) (0.032) 0.019
Robust standard errors in parentheses. (Hansen test shows p-values)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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should raise caution, the results strengthen current predictions on consumption
taxes being a more suitable tax from a growth perspective.
5.2 Regressions using tax revenues as share of
total tax income
Turning to the use of tax revenues instead of rates, Table 5.3 downwards
demonstrate the results of the full model with baseline variables included.
Similarly to the estimations using tax rates, GMM estimations are used with
robust standard errors, and instruments are limited with collapsed instruments
and pca-techniques. Starting with the baseline model, results resemble the
ones found in the previous section. phy cap is consistently significant with
a positive effect, while hum cap behaves in a somewhat irregular way when
personal income taxes are included.
Looking at the variables of interest, the effects seem to differ from what
was found in the previous model. The effect of consumption taxes is no longer
significant. Interesting is that cit rev is significant on a five percent level with
a positive sign in column (1) when the full specification of the model is used.
Also, the effect of personal income taxes are significant and negative in column
three, implying a positive effect when moving from corporate income taxes to
personal income taxes. These results do not at all resemble the results, which
were find in the prior section, with the use of statutory tax rates.
Just as before I also include a measure with no baseline model. This can
be seen in Table 5.4. The results now show a tendency which is partly in line
with theory, and partly against it. A consistent effect is the negative effect of
personal income taxes. In column (3) the effect of pit is negative when cit is
dropped from the estimation, and in column (2), dropping pit has a positive
effect on both cit and vat. Unlike in the case of the full model, vat is now
positive in at least one of the cases, which is according to the expectations.
Intersting is that the effect of corporate income taxes, again is positive and
significant. This time the effect stands regardless of whether the change is from
personal income taxes or consumption taxes.
It should be noted that a positive effect from corporate income taxes has
been found in some previous research. For example, Widmalm (2001) showed
significant but ”fragile” effects from her extreme bound estimates on OECD
countries. Widmalm then gave the following explanation to her findings:
The conclusion must be that corporate taxations effects on the in-
centives of firms are not properly captured by the ratio of corporate
income taxes to total tax revenue. Another possibility is that to the
extent that monopolies are prevalent in the OECD economies, taxes
on corporate profits need not have large effects (Widmalm 2001:
209).
The latter idea, on monopolies, can of course not be ruled out. However,
it lies outside the scope of this paper to investigate measures of competition
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Table 5.3: System GMM estimations of growth using tax revenues
as share of total taxes: 1990-2010. Level equation instrumented
with first difference lags of log gdpp and explanatory variables.
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES log gdpp log gdpp log gdpp
L.log gdpp 0.789*** 0.760*** 0.793***
(0.077) (0.058) (0.054)
hum cap 0.011 0.070*** 0.060***
(0.024) (0.025) (0.021)
phy cap 0.007*** 0.009*** 0.009***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
pop -0.068*** -0.015 -0.012
(0.014) (0.024) (0.021)
legal -0.065 -0.063 -0.130*
(0.089) (0.102) (0.078)
high tech 0.002*** 0.000 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
log exp 0.078* -0.036 -0.018
(0.040) (0.042) (0.048)
pit rev -0.001 -0.004**
(0.003) (0.002)
cit rev 0.003** 0.002
(0.001) (0.002)
vat rev -0.000 -0.002
(0.001) (0.002)
Observations 899 899 899
Number of instruments 62 58 62
Hansen test 38.50 40.60 40.89
(0.918) (0.767) (0.867)
Robust standard errors in parentheses. (Hansen test: p-values)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 5.4: System GMM estimations of growth using tax revenues
as share of total taxes. No baseline model: 1990-2010. Level
equation instrumented with first difference lags of log gdpp
and explanatory variables.
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES log gdpp log gdpp log gdpp
L.log gdpp 0.863*** 0.860*** 0.860***
(0.045) (0.058) (0.048)
log exp 0.076** 0.010 0.058
(0.036) (0.048) (0.040)
legal 0.087 0.198 -0.078
(0.102) (0.156) (0.219)
pit rev -0.005 -0.008*
(0.003) (0.005)
cit rev 0.004*** 0.008***
(0.001) (0.002)
vat rev 0.005** 0.003
(0.003) (0.003)
Observations 900 900 900
Number of instruments 37 34 38
Hansen test 42.56 42.94 43.31
(0.081) (0.035) (0.088)
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Hansen test: p-values
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
within the countries in the sample. The former of the two theories laid forward
by Widmalm is theoretically appealing. Returning to the ideas of Myles (2007),
it is a fact that no incentives of any financial actor is affected by revenue shares,
but by actual tax rates.
5.3 Robustness check: ABGMM estimations
Since the assumptions regarding system GMM are very restrictive, results
using ABGMM are estimated as well. Primarily results using tax rates are
shown in Table 5.5, and results using tax revenues are shown in Table 5.6.
Column 1-3 show the full model, and column 4-6 show results with no baseline
model. Since the interest only lies in investigating robustness for tax variables,
none of the other variables are shown in the Tables.
The results when using statutory tax rates are all with coefficients close to
zero. A simple, yet somewhat technical reason is the first differencing of the
the variables. Since ABGMM uses first difference of the estimated coefficients,
this eradicates some of the effect of a variable with little or no variation over
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Table 5.5: ABGMM estimations of growth using tax rates. 1990-2010. First difference
equation instrumented with lags of log gdpp and first difference of explanatory variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES log gdpp log gdpp log gdpp log gdpp log gdpp log gdpp
pit rate 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
cit rate -0.008* -0.005 -0.001 -0.011
(0.005) (0.004) (0.007) (0.009)
vatgst -0.004 0.008 -0.005 0.004
(0.007) (0.015) (0.010) (0.025)
Observations 414 438 394 414 438 394
Number of instruments 53 53 48 28 29 26
Hansen-test 39.22 39.65 40.17 35.53 39.66 35.23
(0.676) (0.658) (0.418) (0.046) (0.023) (0.027)
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
time. This in turn implies that the small changes in tax variables visible over
time causes a bias towards non-significance. This theory is further strengthened
by looking at the coefficients in Table 5.6, where results using tax revenues are
shown. Since the variance in revenue is larger over time, the coefficients are also
larger.
While the estimated results overall are less significant then when using sys-
tem GMM, it is clear that the general picture is similar. When using tax rates,
the corporate income taxes show a negative sign, which is in line with theory.
The result is also significant in one of the cases, although only at a ten percent
level. Moving to the results from tax revenues one can see that significance lev-
els are generally higher, and just as system GMM estimations, corporate income
taxes are now positive.
At last, several of the estimation performed when excluding the baseline
model (both for system GMM and ABGMM) statistically indicate problems
with overidentification. Here, I rely on the rule of thumb described by sev-
eral researchers on GMM, which is that the number of instruments should be
fewer than the number of panels. As this is the case in almost all estimations,
overidentification is deemed to be less of a problem.
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Table 5.6: ABGMM estimations of growth using revenues as share of total tax in-
come. 1990-2010. First difference equation instrumented with lags of log gdpp and
first difference of explanatory variables.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES log gdpp log gdpp log gdpp log gdpp log gdpp log gdpp
pit rev -0.006 -0.006* -0.020*** -0.016***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.006)
cit rev 0.005*** 0.004 0.006*** 0.012***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
vat rev 0.003* -0.000 0.011*** -0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003)
Observations 854 854 854 855 855 855
Number of instruments 57 54 58 35 32 36
Hansen-test 43.11 42.86 40.96 37.56 39.67 40.72
(0.673) (0.563) (0.786) (0.161) (0.055) (0.114)
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
In this essay I used data on both statutory tax rates and tax revenues as share
of total tax income to estimate a relationship between different tax structures
and GDP growth. I focused on three of the most common: consumption taxes,
personal income taxes and corporate income taxes. The full sample included
45 countries over the years 1990-2010. Most of the countries (35) are OECD
countries, the rest were Latin American non-OECD countries. Estimations were
executed using GMM estimators (instrumented using both system GMM and
Arellano and Bond GMM) with the key aim to compare how results using tax
rates and tax revenues might differ.
Primarily by comparing the two most common measuring approaches, but
also by using countries from different levels of the development scale, GMM and
new control variables, this paper provides an added value to ongoing research.
Theoretically the expectation and prediction was that a change towards more
reliance on consumption taxes imply higher growth. The empirical research
supporting this notion has, however, been thin and not robust.
Interestingly, results were not similar for the different structures. Some
significant positive effects from consumption taxes were found in both the case
of tax rates and revenues. Also, results pointed towards negative effects from
personal income taxes in both regressions.
An important distinction, however, lies in the difference between the inter-
pretation of corporate income taxes. Results were strongly positive in the case
of revenues, but pointed towards a negative effect in the case of tax rates. As
noted in the result section, this essay is not the first to find a positive effect from
corporate income tax revenues, which brings about the important question if
there is something specific regarding corporate income tax revenues that makes
it particularly ill fitted for estimating tax structures. While this might be the
case, nothing theoretically leads to a conclusion were revenues would be a worse
measure of corporate income taxes than personal income taxes. A possible con-
clusion is that the locational decision and investment decisions of companies are
affected by several concepts which are not possible to capture here. A coun-
try which has been able to gain a lot of revenues from corporate income taxes
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might in fact have many non-tax advantages (policies, infrastructure etc.) which
may all give more corporate activity and bigger revenues from corporate income
taxes. If this is the case, the positive effect of corporate income tax revenue is
in fact a reflection of a well functioning entrepreneurial environment.
As always, the results provided above have a couple of drawbacks. Firstly,
pooled regressions such as Arellano and Bond GMM and system GMM estima-
tions assumes that the slope of the different groups are homogeneous. Practically
this implies that all countries included in the data set have similar correlations
between the explanatory variables and growth. Just as different panels need
different intercepts, it might be that countries have differences in the slope of
the coefficient. For example, the effect of economic institutions on growth might
be continually different in Sweden as opposed to El Salvador. Secondly, It is
fully possible that the regressions performed in this paper suffers from reverse
causality. Important to note is, however, when the main target is to look at the
possible differences between measures, problems with endogeneity arise primar-
ily if reverse causality can be expected to be larger or smaller for either revenues
or rates. Whether this is the case is difficult to say, but since it cannot be ruled
out, future research can be strengthened by a combination of heterogeneous
panels and good exogenous instruments.
Even with this in mind, comparing the two pooled estimations, based in
either tax rates or revenues, leaves the simple conclusion that what kind of
measure that is used has an impact on the result. Despite using the same
estimation technique, the same panels and similar covariates, the effect of tax
structure were different. Important to keep in mind is that not only did the
statistical results differ, the economic interpretation is not the same. In one
case the recommendation is to use mainly consumption taxes, while in the other
recommendations also lean towards increasing the use of corporate income taxes.
In future research, more care and time should be spent on arguments regarding
the choice of measure.
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Appendix A
Solow Model - exogenous
growth
A.1 Basic setup
The model assumes one good which can be consumed or saved. If saved, the
good is invested in capital (K). There is one additional input, which is labor
(L). K depreciates with usage, L is fixed for a single worker. Population grows
at a constant rate.
The output level is hence, (where t represents time):
Yt = F (Kt, Lt) (A.1)
A.1 assumes constant returns to scale. An important assumption is further
that savings (s) are fixed. This can be written as 0 < s < 1. Since all savings
are invested, savings must equal investments (I).
It = sF (Kt, Lt) (A.2)
Making the model intertemporal, we know that K depreciates. Assuming
this rate is also fixed (δ):
Kt+1 = sF (Kt, Lt) + (1− δ)Kt (A.3)
A.3 is the first basic result, and is sometimes called the basic capital ac-
cumulations relationship. What it says is simply that capital in period t + 1
equals investments (or savings) in period t plus depreciated capital from period
t. Further denoting population growth by n, A.3 can be expressed in per capita
terms by dividing with labor.
(1 + n)kt+1 = sf(kt) + (1− δ)kt (A.4)
Where kt equals
Kt
Lt
. All we need now is a production function, an initial
value of capital and values for the unknowns of the model: depreciation rate
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(δ), population growth (n), savings rate (s), and we can trace the evolution of
capital accumulation over time.
A.2 Steady state
A simulation of capital over time would show a convergence towards a so
called steady state. In formal terms, this is when the capital stock is constant,
and kt = kt+1. Removing the time trends we end up with the long run equilib-
rium capital/labor ratio (A.6):
(1 + n)k = sf(k) + (1− δ)k (A.5)
sf(k)− (n+ δ)k = 0 (A.6)
The steady state is hence where investment per worker (sf(k)) equals (n+
δ)k. Here the capital/labor ratio hence remains. Returning to A.1, it can be
seen that output per worker will remain as well. Output now only grows with
population.
A.3 Convergence
A last implication of the Solow model is that two countries with similar pro-
duction technologies (i.e. the same capital/labor ratio) and saving rate should
converge to the same steady state levels. Based in this, and the fact that cap-
ital depreciates over time, countries with lower levels of k should grow faster.
Repeating A.6, the steady state is given by sf(k)− (n+ δ)k. Dividing by k, we
get the growth rate (gk) of the steady state:
gk =
sf(k)
k
− (n+ δ) (A.7)
Using the derivative of growth with respect to the capital/labor ratio, we
see that output grows slower with higher levels of k.
∂gk
∂k
=
s
k
(f ′(k)− f(k)
k
) < 0 (A.8)
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Appendix B
Diagnostic tests and
descriptive statistics
B.1 Descriptive statistics
Table B.1: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. N
gdp ppp 20833.684 12405.298 945
log gdpp 9.722 0.729 945
growth 2.95 3.568 945
phy cap 21.749 4.449 945
hum cap 9.321 2.016 945
pop 0.887 0.792 944
high tech 12.671 10.106 945
legal 0.736 0.166 945
log exp 10.372 0.845 945
cit rev 10.338 7.483 945
pit rev 18.91 13.254 945
vat rev 22.367 12.259 945
pit rate 38.329 9.939 462
vatgst 16.958 5.7 621
cit rate 29.404 8.188 747
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B.2 Diagnostics
Assuming a variable is generated from an autoregressive process such as in
B.1, it is possible to rewrite it as B.2, and perform tests of unit roots.
yit = (1− σi)µi + σiyi,t−1 + it (B.1)
∆yit = αi + ρiyit−1 + i,t (B.2)
where ρ = −(1− σi) and αi = (1− σi)µi. A standard panel unit root tests
investigates equation B.2, and the basic hypothesis of ρi = 0 versus ρi < 0.
I use the Im-Pesaran-Shin test (Im et al 2003), which allows for different ρ
across panels. The null hypothesis is the same as in a standard test (all panels
have unit roots), but the alternative is now that a fraction of the panels are
stationary. Formally this means:
H0 : ρi = 0 for all i
H1 : ρi < 0, i = 1, 2..., N1, ρi = 0, i = N1 + 1, N1 + 2, ..., N
The Im-pesaran-shin test then utilizes dickey fuller tests for each panel and
produces an average. In the table downwards W-t-bar statistics and p-values
are reported. Three different functional forms are tested. The first one includes
a trend an cross sectional means, the second a trend but no cross sectional mean
and the final third includes neither trend nor mean. Lags are included according
to the akaike information criteria (AIC).
As noted by Im et al (2003) and more recently Pesaran (2012), it is important
to note that a rejection of the null does not necessarily imply that there are no
problems with unit roots. We do not know how many panels might be stationary,
nor do we know which ones. However, how to estimate the fraction of panels
that are stationary or non-stationary, is still an issue for debate an development.
Time consuming efforts such as estimating a single unit root test for every panel
within every series is not time within the scope of this essay.
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Table B.2: Panel unit root tests
Trend and constant Only trend No trend nor constant
log gdpp 1.9512 2.2725 0.4200
(0.9745) (0.9885) (0.6628)
growth -9.0656 -7.8367 -9.9841
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
phy cap -5.1418 -2.6928 -4.5707
(0.0000) (0.0035) (0.0000)
hum cap 0.9757 0.1869 -2.9862
(0.8354) (0.5741) (0.0014)
pop -16.6702 -10.5709 -5.0257
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
legal -4.4283 -6.3489 -5.9811
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
high tech 1.6306 3.123 -0.6246
(0.9485) (0.9991) (0.2661)
log exp 0.8162 -1.1008 -2.7227
(0.7928) (0.1355) (0.0032)
cit rate . -2.7142 -2.2881
(.) (0.0033) ( 0.0111)
vatgst . -3.6125 -7.2439
(.) (0.0002) ( 0.0000)
pit rate . . .
(.) (.) (.)
cit rev -3.6085 -3.3247 -4.3725
( 0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0000)
vat rev . -8.6422 -10.5528
(.) (0.0000) (0.0000)
pit rev . -1.5413 -2.6354
(.) (0.0616) (0.0042)
p-values in parentheses.
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Appendix C
ABGMM estimation
technique
The following is a detailed description of GMM estimation using Arellano
and Bond. The system GMM is exactly the same in its approach, only that C.1
is not first differenced. Instead the instruments are first differenced.
Using a simple dynamic model without exogenous covariates, the starting
point is C.1, which is transformed using first differencing, leaving C.2.7
∆yi,t = ai + it (C.1)
∆yi,t = γ∆yi,t−1 + ∆it (C.2)
From C.2 one can see that yt−2 is correlated with ∆yi,t−1 but not with ∆it.
The latter conclusion assumes no autocorrelation in the first differenced errors,
or formally.
plim
1
N(T − 1)
N∑
i=1
T∑
t=2
(it − i,t−1)yi,t−2 = E[(it − i,t−1)yi,t−2] = 0 (C.3)
C.3 is one of the moment conditions to use. Assuming moment conditions are
valid, additional conditions strengthens the efficiency of the estimation. Plus,
using further lags might limit the vulnerability towards no serial correlation
somewhat. Arellano and Bond hence add even further lags. For example, for
T = 4, there are three possible moment conditions.
E[(i4 − i,3)yi,2] = 0 (C.4)
E[(i4 − i,3)yi,1] = 0 (C.5)
E[(i4 − i,3)yi,0] = 0 (C.6)
(C.7)
7This section is based on Verbeek 2008: 377-383, Roodman 2009 and Mehrhoff 2009.
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Writing C.4-C.6 in a more compact way brings 6.7, which can be used in a
GMM framework.
E[Zi∆i] = 0 (C.8)
where Zi is an instrument matrix containing the lagged values of the depen-
dent variable and ∆i is a matrix with the differenced error terms.
Zi =

[yi0] 0 · · · 0
0 [yi0, yi,1] 0
...
. . . 0
0 · · · 0 [yi0, · · · , yi,T−2]

∆i =
 i2 − i1· · ·
i,T − i,T−1

The ABGMM estimator is then found by minimizing the sample moments
with respect to γ. This is done by rewriting the error term in C.8 as ∆i =
∆yi − γ∆yi − yi,−1. This gives C.9, and by algebra the estimator in C.10. WN
is a positive weighting matrix. In this paper, the standard matrix, assuming
homoskedasticity, is used. While this may cause some problems, Verbeek (2008:
387) reports that a general weighting matrix has standard errors which are
biased downwards, and that several papers recommends using the simpler one.
minγ
[
1
N
N∑
i=1
Z ′i(∆yi − γ∆yi,−1
]′
WN
[
1
N
N∑
i=1
Z ′i(∆yi − γ∆yi,−1)
]
(C.9)
γˆGMM =
((
N∑
i=1
∆y′i,−1Zi
)
WN
(
N∑
i=1
Z ′i∆yi,−1
))−1
×((
N∑
i=1
∆y′i,−1Zi
)
WN
(
N∑
i=1
Z ′i∆yi,−1
)) (C.10)
Imortant to note is that explanatory variables are added to the instrument
list. Since the model is in first difference form, all the explanatory variables are
added as first difference in the Zi matrix.
C.1 Limiting instruments with pca and collapse
I use two methods to limit the number of instruments. The first one is
often described as ”collapsing” the number of instruments. Intuitively, this
41
is done by shrinking the instrument matrix Zi horizontally. A mathematical
illustration is according to the following, where Z1 is the full instrumentation,
and Z2 represents a collapsed instrument set.
Z1 =
[yi1] 0 0 0 0 00 yi1 yi2 0 0 0
0 0 0yi3 yi2 yi1

Z2 =
[yi1] 0 0yi1 yi2 0
yi3 yi2 yi1

This means that the orthogonality between yi,t−l and ∆i still applies. In-
stead of minimizing moments for each t and l, the estimator now only uses l,
thereby minimizing the number of instruments (Roodman 2009).
The other approach to minimize the number of instruments uses princi-
pal components analysis. This method has been developed and evaluated by
Mehrhoff (2009). The idea is to sort the covariance matrix of Zi according to
highest eigenvalues, and choosing a subset of the full instrument set based in
this ranking. By choosing a subset of the instruments the method allows for
keeping the instruments that has the highest explanatory power of the variance
in the data. In his paper Mehrhoff also uses Monte Carlo analysis to show the
advantage of using pca-techniques. The conclusion is that it is recommended in
combination with collapsed instruments.
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